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Abstract—Reviews spams are prevalent in e-commerce to
manipulate product ranking and customers decisions maliciously.
While spams generated based on simple spamming strategy can
be detected effectively, hardened spammers can evade regular
detectors via more advanced spamming strategies. Previous
work gave more attention to evasion against text and graph-
based detectors, but evasions against behavior-based detectors
are largely ignored, leading to vulnerabilities in spam detection
systems. Since real evasion data are scarce, we first propose
EMERAL (Evasion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAm-
pLing) to generate evasive spams to certain existing detectors.
EMERAL can simulate spammers with different goals and levels
of knowledge about the detectors, targeting at different stages of
the life cycle of target products. We show that, in the evasion-
defense dynamic, only a few evasion types are meaningful to
the spammers, and any spammer will not be able to evade too
many detection signals at the same time. We reveal that some
evasions are quite insidious and can fail all detection signals.
We then propose DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using
EmeRal), based on model re-training on diverse evasive samples
generated by EMERAL. Experiments confirm that DETER is
more accurate in detecting both suspicious time window and
individual spamming reviews. In terms of security, DETER is
versatile enough to be vaccinated against diverse and unexpected
evasions, is agnostic about evasion strategy and can be released
without privacy concern.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many customers post reviews on online commerce websites
such as Amazon and Yelp. the opinionated reviews help shape
product ranking and reputation, find consumers high-quality
products, and make products become more visible via word-
of-mouth [10], [9], [8]. However, such a mechanism has
also attracted many dishonest businesses to hire professional
spammers to post ungrounded reviews to manipulate product
reputations [22], [42], [2], [49]. Customers can be misled
to low quality products, honest businesses can suffer from
unfair competition, and the whole online e-commerce can be
rendered less trustworthy.
To combat opinion spams, prior works have proposed
abundant different detection models based on texts [31], [21],
[22], [52], user-behaviors [31], [51], [11], network struc-
tures [1], [48], [27]. However, more resourceful spammers
can exploit information about the detectors available through
publications, spam-spotting guidance and detection websites1,
to craft insidious spamming campaigns that can evade graph-
based and text-based detectors [7], [16]. However, adversarial
evasions against behavior-based detectors have so far received
less attention. This leads to potential vulnerabilities in spam
detection systems that integrate behavior-based detectors.
Addressing this gap is non-trival, however. First, a deployed
detectors can be subject to adversarial probing and attack.
1https://www.fakespot.com/, and https://reviewmeta.com/
For example, a spammer can gather knowledge about training
data, features and models of the detector and engineer evasive
attacks against the probed detector [35], [56]. Also, diverse
spamming strategies are likely to be adopted simultaneously
by multiple spammers. These scenarios lead to attack-defense
strategy asymmetry — the defending strategy is not optimal
with respect to the actual attacking strategy, and a detector
assuming a fixed evasion strategy [43], [4], [32] is more
vulnerable. Ideally, a detector has to be agnostic of any spam-
ming strategies, but the simple solution of blindly reacting to
anomalies of any detection signals can produce too many false
positives (see the experiments).
Model retraining can obtain unseen but probable attacks to
hardened the detector against future attacks without assuming
a single fixed attacking strategy. The key is to generate
spamming actions to quantitatively manipulate detection sig-
nals under certain domain constraints. In the spam detection
application, existing evasion attacks adopt closed-form or
differentiable objective functions [32], [3], [36], [16], [7]. In
malware detection, regardless of the target detector, direct
manipulation and feature-sampling mapping were adopted,
with domain constraints preserved [53], [43], [33] or totally
ignored [41]. evasions against classification models [3], [23]
are usually Generated in the feature space without constraints
from the application domains. Crafting real spamming attacks
under constraints is not pertaining to the high-level detection
models and is thus more fundamental and challenging. For
example, an attack can post all 5-star reviews to boost the
overall rating of a product from 2 to 4 stars, but the attack will
have a detectable skew rating distribution, due to the constraint
over changes in average rating and attack rating distribution.
While genetic algorithms [53], [43] can hypothetically modify
previous spamming campaigns for evasion, the approach is
not scalable and requires a known spamming attack which is
usually not available.
To address the challenges, we first identify, as the target
of the spammer, a set of detection signals [55], [34], [35],
[38], [51], [11] that characterize spammer behaviors. We
propose “EMERAL”, a maximum entropy model to quantita-
tively encode the spammers’ knowledge, objective and domain
constraints. By solving the resulting optimization problem
we obtain an optimal attacking vector that further guide the
generation of real evasive spams. The model, captures ex-
plicitly capture the quantitative dependencies among multiple
detection signals for realistic attack generation. The model is
general, as multiple types of evasions against behavior-based
detection signals can be included as objectives or constraints
during different stage of the life-cycle of a product.
With EMERAL, we propose a novel defense, DETER,
TABLE I: Abnormal reviewer behavior detection signals.
Signal names Suspicious when Descriptions
NR (∆NR) H (H)
Number of reviews and change
of NR in a window [51].
∆CAR H (H) Change in Cumulative Average Rating
CAR-DEV H
Deviation of CAR from
its predicted value [55].
NPR (∆NPR) H
Number of positive
reviews and its changes.
EN (∆EN) L (H)
Entropy of ratings (and its
change) in each window.
KL-DIV H
KL-divergence between rating
distribution of a window
and historic distribution.
based on retraining, where training data containing possible
future evasive spams are first generated by EMERAL and
then used to train more effective detector without assuming
a fixed evasion strategy. Based on the weights learned by
DETER and the properties of evasion generation, DETER
can be released to the spammer without security concern.
Experimentally, the new defense is shown to be superior to
any fixed single detection signals, simple signal aggregation
and even ensembles of multiple classifiers trained on the same
adversarial examples.
II. DETECTION AND THREAT MODELS
A review system has a set of accounts U = {u1, . . . , un},
items V = {v1, . . . , vm}, and reviews R = {rij : i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}, where rij is the review posted
by account ui to item vj . rij contains its text contents c(rij),
its rating s(rij) and its posting time t(rij). We focus on
detection model based on aggregated rating behaviors over
time [12], [51], [11], [24], [55]: reviews in R are grouped
into windows and for each window, numeric detection signals
in Table I are computed to obtain window suspicious scores.
These window-wise signals are unique and not available in
detection on the review, reviewer and item level, and can help
detect individual reviews [12]. We focus on spammers, be it
human or bots, with the goal of promoting the target products’
long and short term reputation, measured in cmulative average
rating (CAR) and current month ranking (CMR, defined as
the ranking of a business, among all businesses, based on
the current month’s average rating [44]). CAR and CMR are
shown to be vulnerable to spammers’ manipulations [26], [45],
[13]. The demoting spams can be handled similarly by the
proposed models. We first introduce behavior-based detection
signals defined by previous work.
A. Time series based detection signals
Normal review traffic shall arrive in a smooth manner while
spamming reviews usually arrive in a more abrupt pattern [51],
[11]. Besides, to effectively promote product reputation, spam-
mers also aim at lifting the average rating of the targets
significantly [10], [9], [8]. Time series-based detection con-
structs and monitors time series to spot such changes in review
volume and rating. A time series is a sequence of temporally
ordered random variables x = [X1, X2, . . . , Xt, . . . ], and
xnm = [Xm, . . . , Xn] denotes the portion from time windowm
to n. For the t-th window (we also refer t to the window or the
timespan of the window), the signals NR (number of reviews)
and CAR (cumulative average rating) can be calculated to
obtain two time series:
NR(t) = |{r : t(r) ∈ t}|, CAR(t) =
∑
t(r)≤t s(r)
Nt
,
where Nt is the number of reviews ever posted up to window
t. These two series can capture the large volume of spamming
reviews and inflated average ratings. Changes in NR and CAR,
denoted by ∆NR and ∆CAR, can capture the abrupt changes
in the volume of reviews and accumulated average rating:
∆NR(t) = NR(t)− NR(t− 1),
∆CAR(t) = CAR(t)− CAR(t− 1).
The deviation of the actual time series value from the
value predicted by a model that assumes smoothness of the
series, such as auto-regressive models, can capture unexpected
changes in the time series. In particular, an order d auto-
regressive model (AR(d)) predicts Xt using historic data x
t−1
t−d
and a linear model θ(t)
Xt =
d∑
i=1
θ
(t)
i Xt−i =
〈
θ(t),xt−1t−d
〉
. (1)
The deviation of the predicted CAR (ĈAR(t)) from the
actual CAR, can be used for detection (only promotion is
considered):
CAR-DEV(t) = max{ĈAR(t)− CAR(t), 0}.
The larger the CAR-DEV, the more suspicious the window.
B. Distribution-based detection signals
A spammer needs to post a large number of positive fake re-
views to promote the target. Thus if the percentage of positive
reviews within a window is abnormally high, there are likely
spamming activities. The signal PR (Positive Ratio) [38], [35]
is calculated based on this intuition:
PR(t) =
|r : s(r) ≥ 4 and t(r) ∈ t|
nt
,
where nt is the number of reviews within window t. Second,
the overall rating distributions of the t-th window p(t) =
[p1(t), . . . , p5(t)], with pi(t) be estimated by |r : s(r) =
i and t(r) ∈ t|/nt, can be perturbed by spamming ratings
and deviate from the background rating distribution. Such
distortion in rating distribution can be used as for spam
detection [12], [34], [38]. Let p = [p1, . . . , p5] be the rating
distribution of all historic ratings up to time t: pi = |r : s(r) =
i and t(r) ≤ t|/Nt. The KL divergence between these two
distributions detects distortion in rating distribution:
KL-DIV(p(t) ‖ p) =
5∑
i=1
pi(t) log
pi(t)
pi
2
The larger the KL-DIV, the farther p(t) is away from p, and
thus the more suspicious the t-th window. Third, define the
rating entropy
EN(p(t)) = −
5∑
i=1
pi(t) log pi(t)
If the rating entropy of a window is low, then the ratings
therein are highly concentrating on a certain value while a nor-
mal distribution shall have a certain level of dispersion across
multiple values [38] (such as a U-shape [17]). A related signal
is the change in rating entropy ∆EN = EN(t) − EN(t − 1).
The window t is suspicious if ∆EN< 0.
III. EMERAL: AN EVASION GENERATOR
After discussing the threat model, we present EMERAL (Eva-
sion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAmpLing) to generate
evasions against behavior-based detection signals. The result-
ing optimization problem allows effective and efficient evasion
generation (Section III-D).
A. Threat model
A threat model captures what knowledge about the defense
system an adversary can learn about and exploit to evade
the defense system [7], [43], [46], [41]. Abundant review
data, including account and item profiles, review ratings and
timestamps, are publicly available on review websites to all
users, including spammers. For new or less popular products,
less historic data is available and yet they have a higher incen-
tive to spam. An evasion should be able to generate attacks
even with scarce data. Obtaining labeled data is easy through
multiple channels: 1) released review data are filtered before
being made public and thus represent normal reviews; 2) Yelp
further releases identified spams; 3) spam spotting services,
such as Fakespot and ReviewMeta, release predicted class
labels or probability too. Behavior-based detection signals are
published with great details [35]. Fakespot and ReviewMeta
further explain to users what detection signals are used to
detec spams. Regarding hyper-parameter for detection signal
constructions, we empirically show that the proposed evasion
model does not require exact knowledge for effective evasions
(Figures 1e and 1j). Signals based on review texts or graphs are
orthogonal to the behavior-based signals, and a spammer does
not need knowledge about these signals to conduct successful
evasions. A detection algorithm essentially aggregate multiple
detection signals for detection. Spammers can have different
levels of knowledge about the aggregation. A naive spammer
can only be aware of the signals but not how they are
aggregated. A spammer with moderate knowledge can know
and assume simple aggregation methods, such as uniform
linear combination or taking the most suspicious signal. Lastly,
a spammer with perfect knowledge knows the algorithm that
aggregate the signals.
B. Evading behavior-based signals
In a spamming campaign, a spammer needs to know the exact
ratings of each of spams to manipulate target rating while
evading signals based on rating distribution, such as KL-DIV,
EN, ∆EN and PR. We propose to first find an evading rating
distribution and then sample ratings from the distribution for
the spams.
To evade KL-DIV, all ratings, including spamming and
normal ones, in the current time window should have a rating
distribution p close to p¯ that the defender considers normal.
Specifically, let R ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} be a random variable of
ratings such that p(R = r) = pr ≥ 0 and
∑5
r=1 pr = 1. For
a target with many ratings, the spammer can estimate p¯i from
the ratings using MLE. For the t-th window, the spammer can
find p with minimal KL-divergence to p¯
min
p
KL(p||p¯) =
∑5
r=1 pr log
pr
p¯r
. (2)
The spammer wants to move CAR to x˜t from xt, where
xt is the CAR at time t without spams. When targeting at
promotional spamming, the spammer needs the manipulated
CAR to be close to but not to exceed the target x˜t. Let Nt−1
be the number of ratings accumulated up to time t, nt be the
number of existing ratings at time t without the spamming
ratings, and nδ be the number of spamming ratings to be
added. Ep(R) =
∑5
r=1 r × pr is the expectation of R. Then
the manipulated CAR after the attack is (Nt−1xt−1 + (nt +
nδ)Ep[R])/(Nt + nt + nδ) and the goal becomes:
x˜t − ǫ ≤
Nt−1xt−1 + (nt + nδ)Ep[R]
Nt + nt + nδ
≤ x˜t, (3)
where ǫ > 0 is a small positive number to allow slack
in x˜t. In addition, the spammer can evade ∆EN and NPR
by adding relevant constraints, leading to the following
inequality-constrained KL-divergence minimization problem:
min
p
KL(p||p¯)
s.t. Ep[R] ≤ U ,
(Nt + nt + nδ)x˜t −Nt−1xt−1
nt + nδ
,
−Ep[R] ≤ B ,
(Nt + nt + nδ)(x˜t − ǫ)−Nt−1xt−1
nt + nδ
,
−H(p) ≤ −(Ht−1 +Hδ) , −H,
p4 + p5 ≤ P,
∑
r
pr = 1.
(4)
The first two constraints are derived from Eq. (3), and the third
enforces the rating distribution entropy H(p) to be at least
Ht−1+Hδ to evade ∆EN (change in entropy). The constraint
p4+p5 < P ensures that after spamming, the ratio of positive
reviews (4 and 5 star ratings) will not exceed P to evade
PR (ratio of positives). The optimization can be solved using
Lagrangian multiplier method:
max
α,β,γ,λ
L(α, β, γ, λ)
s.t. α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0
(5)
L(α, β, λ, γ) = −(1+γ) logZ−(1+γ)−αU+βB−λp+γH
and Z =
∑5
r=1 pr =
∑5
r=1 exp(Sr/(1 + γ)) with
Sr = log p¯r − (α− β)r − 1− λI(r) − γ (6)
3
We can use gradient ascent to find the optimal Lagrangian
multipliers α∗, β∗, γ∗ and λ∗. Evading EN is similar and can
be done by setting the target distribution p¯ to the uniform
distribution.
The above optimization problem assumes that the number
of spamming reviews (nδ) and the target CAR value (x˜t)
are given. We further set these parameters to evade ∆CAR
(change in Cumulative Average Rating), CAR-DEV (Cumu-
lative Average Rating deviation) and ∆NR (change in the
number of reviews) that focus on abrupt changes in time series.
By assuming that the defender adopts a degree d AR model
θ to capture CAR deviation, the spammer sets δt = x˜t − xt
so that 1) x˜t is as high as possible; 2) |x˜t − xˆt| < ǫ to evade
the detection of CAR-DEV; where ǫ is a small number and
xˆt is the predicted CAR by the AR model. 3) xˆt+1(δt) is
maximized to allow a larger δt+1 to be added to xt+1 while
|xt+1(δt) + δt+1 − xˆt+1| < ǫ.
Note that xˆt+1 is a function of δt since the next AR model
θ(t+1) is updated on x˜t. Overall the spammer can
max
δ
δ + xˆt+1(δ)
s.t. 0 ≤ δ, |xˆt − (xt + δ)| < ǫ, xt + δ < U,
(7)
where U is an upper bound of the time series (U = 5
for CAR). Assuming the spammer mimics the defender by
training θ using online gradient descent with learning rate
η, then Eq. (7) becomes the following constrained quadratic
programming problem:
max
δ
[
1 + θ
(t+1)
1 + η
(
xt−1t−d
)⊤
xtt−d+1
]
δ + ηxt−1δ
2
s.t. max{0, xˆt − xt − ǫ} ≤ δ
min{U − xt, xˆt − xt + ǫ} ≥ δ
The optimal δ is denoted by δ∗t and is used to set
x˜t = xt + δ
∗
t in Eq. (3). The spammer also wants to evade
detection based on burst detection [51], [11]. We can add
the constraint |xt−1 − (xt + δ)| < ǫ, to reduce ∆CAR.
To reduce ∆NR, a spammer samples nδ ratings from the
distribution obtained from Eq. (4), such that nδ is below the
p-percentile of all positive historical increments in NR. To
optimize δ, the spammer needs to know both the degree of AR
model and the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the
detection signals on the defender side. We empirically show
that lacking knowledge of d and p will not prevent spammers
from conducting effective and evasive attacks.
The overall evasion procedure EMERAL is described in Al-
gorithm 1. EMERAL requires the target to have a reasonably
long history of reviews to calculate the evasion parameters.
Note that the algorithm may fail to find an evasive spamming
plan for a window, and in that case, the spammer will not
attempt to attack. Based on preliminary experiment, there are
only 9 combinations of detection singals, denoted by E1 to
Algorithm 1 EMERAL
Input: Reviews of a target; maximum number of trials M .
Output: Ratings of spamming reviews to be posted.
Select nδ and δ
∗
t based on historic reviews.
Set rating distribution: p5 = 1 and pi = 0, i = 1, . . . , 4.
if Evade rating distribution-based signals then
Use nδ and δ
∗
t to solve problem (4) to find p(t).
Exit without spams if no evasive rating distribution found.
end if
while Not succeed and number of trials < M do
Sample nδ ratings from p(t) satisfying constraints δ
∗
t .
Return sampled ratings if no constraint violated.
end while
Exit without spams.
E9 2, that are profitable for the spammers to evade.
C. EMERAL for early spamming: evasion E-A and E-B
It is shown that dishonest businesses have a strong motiva-
tion to conduct promotional spamming early on when their
products are open for review [24], [38]. We adapt EMERAL
to generate evasive spams for such situations. A new product
will have a smaller number of reviews for a spammer to probe
evasion parameters from the CDFs of the signals. However,
a spammer can leverage the CDFs of the signals based on
the early reviews of other products and estimate the evasion
parameters. In particular, a spammer can obtain NR, ∆NR,
∆CAR and rating distribution of the early time windows of
all available products, and then tries maximize the entropy
while safisfying constraints over NR, ∆NR and ∆CAR (E-
A). Evasion E-B tries to post a maximum number of 5 star
reviews to evade NR, ∆NR and ∆CAR at the same time.
D. Empirical properties of EMERAL on late spamming
We use datasets collected from Amazon and Yelp [15], [38].
To spam targets with long review histories, we filter products
on Amazon with less than 1000 reviews or having less than
37 weeks of reviews, and restaurants on Yelp having less
than 37 months of reviews (a month/week is referred to as a
“time window” on the two datasets, respectively). The results
are 383 products with 1175088 reviews on Amazon, and 327
restaurants with 247117 reviews on Yelp. The evasions are
created on each target for the last 5 consecutive time windows
based on knowledge obtained from all previous time windows
(32 in total). We compute evasions with strategies E1 to E9,
assuming that the spammer aims to keep each detection signal
lower than the 80 percentiles of the corresponding signals’
CDFs after the attacks.
The average numbers of total/negative/positive spams posted
in all test windows by each evasion on the two datasets
are shown in Figure 1a and 1f. One can observe that all
evasions post much more positive spams than negatives to
promote business ratings and rankings. Interestingly, if a
spammer decides to evade rating distribution related signals,
as with evasions E5 to E9, some negative reviews have to be
2 The 9 combinations are: E1=[NR], E2=[NR, ∆NR], E3=[NR, CAR-
DEV], E4=[NR, CAR-DEV, ∆CAR], E5=[NR, CAR-DEV, KL-DIV],
E6=[NR, CAR-DEV, KL-DIV, ∆EN], E7=[NR, CAR-DEV, KL-DIV, NPR],
E8=[NR, CAR-DEV, EN], E9=[NR, CAR-DEV, EN, ∆EN]
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0
10
20
30
40
50 Late negativesLate positives
Early negatives
Early positvies
(a) Number of spams
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8 Late Early
(b) Attack rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Late
Early
(c) Target CMR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035 Late
Early
(d) Target CAR
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentile(%)
0
1
2
3
4
(e) Sensitivity to p
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5 Late negatives
Late positives
Early negatives
Early positvies
(f) Number of spams
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5 Late Early
(g) Attack rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
0.200 Late
Early
(h) Target CMR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B
Evasion strategies
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010 Late
Early
(i) Target CAR
5 7 9 11 13 15 same
d
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
(j) Sensitivity to d
Fig. 1: First 4 columns (top: Amazon, bottom: Yelp) show, from left to right: the number of total/negative/positive spams posted, successful
rate of evasion, average promotions in CMR and CAR under late and early evasions. Last column: sensitivity of ranking promotion per spam
on Amazon regarding parameters p and d of the defender (other metrics are similar on both datasets).
posted, while with evasions E1 to E4, there is no negative
reviews. Since EMERAL does not guarantee that an evasive
rating distribution can be found, Figures 1b and 1g show the
percentages of windows that an evasion is possible. Evasions
1-4 are successful in most of the windows (more than 70%)
while Evasions 5-9 are more conservative due to constraints
over rating distribution. Figures 1c and 1d on the top row
show the promotions in the target’s CMR and CAR per
spamming review, averaged over all targets and test windows,
on the Amazon dataset. We can see that evasions 5-9 are less
profitable to the spammers as the promotions are rather small,
and evasions 1-4 can promote the target rather effectively.
We tried to evade other combinations of the signals using
EMERAL but found out that it is hard to find evasions
valuable to the spammers. As a result, the defender needs not
to consider evasions against other combination of signals in
Table I.
E. Empirical properties of EMERAL on early spamming
The early windows of the datasets that are not used for
late spamming are used for early evasions. In the same set
of figures for late spamming, we use the last two bars in
each subfigure to demonstrate the properties of early evasive
spamming. In Figures 1a and 1f, we can see that average
numbers of total/negative/positive spams post in each early
windows. There is not large difference in the total number, but
E-A creates a small amount of negative reviews due to entropy
maximization. In Figures 1b and 1g, we can see that E-B has
a successful rate two times of the rate of E-A, leading to
higher per spam utility in CMR and CAR promotions, shown
in Figures 1c, 1h, 1d and 1i. We conclude that early spamming
is very attractive to spammers and advanced defense against
early spamming need to be deployed, as we will do next.
Spammer knowledge requirements From Section III-B,
for evasive late spamming, it seems that the spammer needs
to know the degree the AR model and the p-percentile of the
CDF of historic CAR to find out ǫ for solving Eq. (8). For
evasion E4, which requires d and p, the two parameters can
be selected from wide ranges so that they can be different
from the values used by the defender. Figures 1e and 1j
show the ranking promotion brought by E4 after detection
based on the spammers’ assumptions is not much affected by
the inaccurate knowledge of these two hyper-parameters. For
example, different d values achieve similar spamming utility
as when d is the same as the value set by the defender. There
is no parameter d in early spamming.
IV. DETER: EVASION AGNOSTIC DEFENSES
The defender may assume a fixed evasion strategy that is
optimal for the spammer and then devise a detection model
accordingly. For example, based on the above analysis, the
defender can assume that a rational spammer will only use
Evasion 4 to spam late review windows. In reality, multi-
ple spammers can choose different evasion strategies and a
spammer can change its strategy as well. We propose such a
defense called DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using
EmeRal) that works well regardless of which evasion strategy
is adopted by the spammers.
DETER is based on defense model re-training [43], [29],
[23], [20]. However, the re-training relies on a evasion gen-
erator, which is not available without EMERAL. For a target
with long review history (with more than 30 windows), earlier
windows (the first 30 windows) are used to train an EMERAL
model, which generates 9 types of evasions on later windows
(after the 30-th windows, group 1) of the targets. For early
spamming, all targets are partitioned into two subsets. We
pool all early windows (the first 30 ones) of the targets in the
first subset together to train a single EMERAL model, which
generates two types of early evasions (Section III-C) on all
early windows of the targets in the second subset. Detection
signals are computed for each window where evasion are
attempted. Labels are assigned accordingly (“spammed” (or
“not spammed”) if EMERAL finds an evasion (or fails to
generate any spam)). For the two groups of windows with
5
TABLE II: Detection AUC under different strategy profiles with late/early spamming. Top: Amazon, buttom: Yelp.
(a) AUC of detection of late spamming on Amazon (rows: evasions, columns: defenses).
Evasions Best P wm wa wr EN M EN A DETER
Rand1 0.91 0.91±0.007 0.91±0.007 0.89±0.008 0.74±0.007 0.90 0.93±0.006
Rand2 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.83±0.006 0.73±0.011 0.84±0.006 0.87±0.006
E1 0.91 0.85 0.86 0.84±0.007 0.91 0.89 0.92
E2 0.90 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.88 0.90
E3 0.89∗ 0.82 0.83 0.81±0.008 0.87 0.85 0.88
E4 0.75∗ 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.74
E5 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.71 0.97 0.98
E6 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.90±0.007 0.62 0.97 0.98
E7 0.98∗ 0.96±0.005 0.96 0.95±0.011 0.72±0.011 0.97±0.007 0.98
E8 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.72 0.97 0.98
E9 0.96∗ 0.92 0.91 0.89±0.014 0.52±0.009 0.92±0.006 0.96
(b) AUC of detection of early spamming on Amazon
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(c) AUC of detection of late spamming on Yelp (rows: evasions, columns: defenses).
Evasions Best P wm wa wr EN M EN A DETER
Rand1 0.77±0.012 0.71±0.012 0.73±0.011 0.71±0.016 0.67±0.015 0.70±0.017 0.80±0.015
Rand2 0.73±0.013 0.65±0.012 0.67±0.012 0.65±0.016 0.73±0.044 0.73±0.051 0.76±0.016
E1 0.73 0.63 0.66 0.65±0.007 0.82 0.81 0.78
E2 0.73 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.82 0.81 0.78
E3 0.73 0.63 0.65 0.64±0.007 0.81 0.80 0.77
E4 0.69 0.58 0.61 0.59±0.006 0.78 0.77 0.71
E5 0.99∗ 0.97 0.96 0.95±0.011 0.71±0.009 0.93±0.009 0.95±0.007
E6 0.99∗ 0.95±0.008 0.95±0.008 0.94±0.008 0.75±0.007 0.93±0.007 0.97
E7 0.99∗ 0.95 0.95 0.93±0.009 0.73 0.95 0.98
E8 0.99∗ 0.96 0.96 0.95±0.012 0.74±0.008 0.95±0.007 0.97
E9 0.99∗ 0.94 0.94 0.92±0.019 0.70±0.012 0.90±0.007 0.95
(d) AUC of detection of early spamming on Yelp
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attempted evasion, respectively, the defender pools the labeled
windows from all targets for all evasion types within the group
to train a logistic regression model (using sklearn with the
default hyper-parameters) to detect windows spammed with
unknown evasion strategy during late or early review periods.
A. Effectiveness of DETER for late spam detection
Suspicious window detection AUC is used as the defender’s
metric 3. As two baselines, the defender can train a classifier
using data obtained from each evasion type, and during testing,
detect spammed windows by pooling all classifier outputs
using the MAX or AVG function (denoted by EN M and
EN A, short for ENsemble Max and ENsemble Average,
respectively). DETER, EN M and EN A are all based on
retraining and agnositic about evasion strategies, as opposed
to wi, i = 1, . . . , 9, wa, wm and wr, which are only best for
a single evasion strategy.
Two randomized evasion strategies are created to confirm
that DETER works without knowing the evasion strategy. The
first one (“Rand1”) assumes that each window is spammed
with one of the 9 pure strategies with equal probability, and
the second (“Rand2”) assumes that half of the windows are
spammed with Evasion 4, while the remaining windows are
spammed with the other strategies with equal probability.
Overall, there are 11 evasion strategies (9 pure: E1 to E9,
plus 2 mixed: Rand1 and Rand2) and 15 defense strategies
(9 pure: wi, i = 1, . . . , 9, plus wm, wa, wr, EN M, EN A
and DETER), resulting in 11×15 strategy profiles. Rand1,
Rand2, E5 - E9 are randomized algorithms and we repeat
each evasion and detection for 10 times, and the means of
3the defender cares about both precision and recall, while a spammer cares
only about promotion effect, which is related to recall but not precision.
the AUCs under each strategy profile are reported in Table II.
Standard deviation of AUC greater than 5e − 3 are reported
as the subscripts of the means. Evasion strategies E1 - E4 are
deterministic and only one experiment is needed. Due to space
limit, we show the best AUC of {wi, i = 1, . . . , 9} (Best P).
From the table, we have the following observations. First,
under strategies Rand1 and Rand2, DETER has the highest
AUC than all the remaining defenses. Among the agnostic
defenses, by averaging, EN A is the runner-up beating EN M,
indicating that taking the maximum of the output is a rea-
sonable defense but can be over-sensitive. Second, Best P
is always better than wm, wa and wr, and we conclude
that if the defender knows the exact evasion strategy, it can
pick a single detection signal, rather than guessing using
w
r, which is inferior to DETER. Third, under E3, E4, E7
and E9 on the Amazon dataset, and E5 to E9 on the Yelp
dataset, Best P outperforms all agnostic strategies (indicated
by bold fonts with asterisks). However, such performances
are based on the unrealistic assumption that all windows
are spammed with the specific evasion strategies, and cannot
be achieved in reality. According to Figure 1, E5 to E9
are not effective in promoting target reputations (unprofitable
for spammers) and a spammer is less likely to select them,
although DETER outperforms or is comparable to Best P. The
take-away is that, by evasive spamm generation, data pooling
and detection model retraining, a defender can achieve state-
of-the-art detection performance.
One may question the security of DETER: what if a
spammer reads this paper and then implements and evades
DETER? Figure 2 shows the weights learned by DETER
over the 9 detection signals on two datasets. We can see that
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Fig. 2: Weights over detection signals learned by DETER.
CAR-DEV is not used much by DETER, but ∆CAR and
NR are always active to prevent the dominating evasion E4.
With other few medium weights watching rating distribution
entropy, it would be quite difficult for a spammer to evade this
set of detection signals, while evading a larger set of signals
will significantly reduce reputation promotion (see Section ??
especially Figure ??). The strategy profile consisting of the
trained DETER model and any evasion strategies is a Nash
equilibrium when the defender aims at detection AUC and
spammers aim at promotion.
B. Effectiveness of DETER for early spam detection
For early spamming, the spammer can choose from two
evasion strategies, E-A and E-B. As shown in Figures IIb
and IId, when dealing with evasion type E-A, the 3 adaptive
detectors based on EMERAL and re-training (EN M, EN A
and DETER) have comparable or even better performance than
the best pure detection strategy (Best P). When dealing with
E-B, these three detectors significantly outperform Best P. In
sum, EMERAL provides sufficient knowledge about a wide
spectrum of spams to vaccinate the defender in the face of
whatever evasion strategy.
C. Effectiveness of DETER for spamming review detection
We adopt the state-of-the-art spam detector, SpEagle [38],
which combine the features of the reviews, reviewers and
products with the reviewer-product graph. We show that the
window suspicious scores generated by those window detec-
tors based on re-training can help SpEagle identify individual
spamming reviews. We run evasion E4 for late spamming and
evasion E-B for early spamming on YelpChi and YelpNYC
datasets [38], respectively, generating spams to be detected by
SpEagle. The above evasions provide the rating distributions
of the spams in test windows, and the actual spams are
posted by a random subset of the existing accounts at some
randomly picked time during the test window. To rank reviews
based on their suspicious scores, we multiply the review
posteriors produced by SpEagle by the suspicious score of
the window where the review sits in. The detection AUC are
shown in Figure 3. It is clear that those window detectors
based on re-training using EMERAL (EN M, EN A and
DETER) outperform the remaining ones. In particular, DETER
outperforms EN M and EN A in the late spamming cases and
is comparable to EN A in the early spamming cases.
V. RELATED WORK
Opinion spams are different from social spams [18], [14], [28],
[54], web spams [50], email spams [39] in terms of spamming
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Fig. 3: Detection of spams in early and late evasion on two
Yelp datasets. (Left:YelpChi, right: YelpNYC)
goal and detection mechanism, and we focus on opinion
spams. Graph-based approaches leverage the relationships
between reviewer accounts, reviews and products to detect
spams, suspicious accounts and dishonest businesses [47],
[30], [38], even with evasive camouflages [16] Text-based
approaches identify spamming reviews based on the contents
of the reviews, using linguistic features and psychological
features [37], topic model [40], semantic analysis [25], etc.
Behavior-based approaches [51], [11], [55], [24], [31], [21]
look for abnormal patterns in the the volume and distribution
of user ratings, which are complementary to graphs and
texts based approaches. To the best of our knowledge, no
previous work has considered generative models for evading
and securing behavior-based opinion spam detection.
Randomized defenses help to obfuscate the details of the
defender and prevent attackers from taking advantage of
any static defense strategies [5], [46]. DETER does not
need randomization for privacy purpose, since it prevents the
spammers from creating campaigns that are both evasive and
effective. If privacy is indeed a concern when using DETER,
randomization can be implemented via differential privacy [6].
Randomized evasion is handled by DETER, demonstrated by
two randomized evasion strategies.
Generating adversarial examples is critical to secure and ro-
bust machine learning models: if the models can see (foresee)
most/all of the adversarial examples during training [29], [43],
then during test time, most adversarial examples crafted by
the attackers can be correctly detected. Adversarial example
can be generated in either feature spaces [32], [19], [46] or
problem spaces [46], [53], [41]. Generation in the feature
space usually admits a convex and differentiable optimization
problem whose solutions can be efficiently found as adversar-
ial examples. However, the generated vectors usually cannot be
mapped to realistic examples in the problem space and often
tend to be over-pessimistic. Example generation in problem
spaces requires domain knowledge and usually involves non-
convex and non-differentiable optimization problems. The
work here is the first step towards rigorous, efficient and
realistic adversarial spam generation in the problem space.
Game theory has been used in secure machine learning [5],
[32], [4]. They assume that the attacker and defender know
each other’s objective function and try to use game theory to
arrive at a Nash equilibrium so that both parties do not seek
other solutions. We use the concept of game theory to analyze
the behaviors of a rational and well-informed spammer, instead
of using game theory to find a secure defense solution. In fact,
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a Nash equilibrium may be too strong an assumption in the
context of spam detection, as multiple spammers can adopt
different strategies or a spammer may have no knowledge
about the defender’s strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a flexible and general computational evasion
model (“EMERAL”) against state-of-the-art spam detection
techniques for both early and late stage review periods of the
targets. The spamming campaigns generated are effective in
reputation manipulation and detection evasions, and require
only public available datasets and published detection methods
without knowing the exact hyper-parameter values. EMERAL
does not require differentiable models or heuristic search. We
showed that a spammer can only evade a handful of signals
but has a dominating evasion strategy representing the worst
case for the defender. We considered more realistic scenarios
with mixtures of evasion strategies, and devised DETER, an
evasion-agnostic defenses based on model retraining. Exper-
iments showed that data pooling is the best defense, among
other ensemble methods.
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